Bogus Bills Bring Strict Security

Counterfeiting at your in-plant? Think it can't happen? Think again. Color copiers can turn regular folks into felons.

THOUGH EDWARD Olenenu had nothing to do with the manufacturing end of Columbia University's in-plant, he did have access to one of its color copiers at night. Reportedly, he produced some top-quality work on that color copier, too. The results were so good, in fact, they landed him in jail.

The arrest of Olenenu and three other men on charges of counterfeiting about $75,000 in phony $20 bills at Columbia's print shop underscored the fact that color copiers are a powerful technology—powerful enough to pose a serious security threat.

Steve Berry, Columbia print services manager at the time, said the story made national news because of its unusual nature, but hastened to add that security is a big concern for in-plants running color copiers.

"In-plant managers need to be much more zealous about accountability for virtually every copy made," Berry recommended.

He should know. Until the counterfeiting scheme was discovered, five or six people had access to the copier at night. One of them was Olenenu, who enjoyed virtually free reign over the machine because there was no check system in place to determine how the copier was used. Freedom may be at end for him for quite a while. Each of the four men charged faces up to 15 years in prison, if convicted.

Since the arrests, Berry has acted to prevent anything like that from ever occurring in his shop again: Only one or two people have access to the machine at night now, and they are responsible for documenting everything they do.

"The problem is that even though there's technology in place on a lot of these devices to prevent copying U.S. currency," Berry explained, "there are ways around it."

One in-plant manager who runs two color copiers says he once tested the anti-counterfeiting security of one of his copiers. Sure enough, he says, the machine produced a copy of a gray dollar bill.

Though his machines have always been on restricted access, he adds, that precaution was taken primarily to avoid having employees copy photographs of their grandchildren and the like. Also, his shop has never kept a firm accounting of who copied what and why. But after hearing Berry's story, he plans to sit down with his supervisor and develop a cross-checking system to tighten security.

Berry would certainly encourage him.

"You need to restrict access or monitor the thing very thoroughly," he stated. "This means accounting for all your meter clicks, all wastage, things like that. I had a multiple-shift operation, and while the evening shift wasn't responsible for the counterfeiting, it was then that access to the area provided means."

Berry isn't at liberty to discuss specific details of how these men were exposed, but he did note that security technology embedded in the copier ultimately tripped up the counterfeiters. They were able to circumvent the first layers of security, but not all.

Berry says the Secret Service referred to the phony $20 bills as fair imitations, but Berry notes that the Service sees the finest, press-manufactured counterfeits so its standards are pretty high. A color copier simply can't do the same quality, detailed job as a press, but Berry maintains the average person would have thought the bills produced on Columbia's copier were perfectly acceptable.

Considering that most counterfeit operations produce bills up into the millions, the scheme at Columbia was relatively minor. Still, once the federal authorities got involved they notified Berry and began running a careful sting to nab everyone responsible.

"We were aware of the [sting] operation early on," Berry said. "We knew there was a case within Columbia University, and while we had certain suspicions we couldn't categorically go after somebody because the secret service wanted to catch the individual or individuals involved. Consequently, they wanted to work it very slowly, like an onion, from the outside in—tracing bills back from where they were passed."

Election year politics increased these days of intrigue. As the Secret Service gathered evidence for arrests, the agents working the case were frequently called away to guard presidential candidates. The investigatory ranks were decimated when Clinton left for Australia. Eventually, enough evidence was gathered and arrests were made.

Berry says some of the accused didn't appear to realize the seriousness of their crime, so add ignorance of currency law to the list of reasons for maintaining vigilant copier security.

"I think one of [the accused] had a pretty good idea of what he was doing," Berry claimed. "But two of them were pretty naive about what they had gotten themselves into. They thought it very much like a college prank. I don't think they understood when they were finally caught out that they were facing some fairly serious jail-time. 'Oh, first offense—slap on the wrist.' That may be the case for a lot of things, but not for currency violations."

(Note: Sadly, Steve Berry passed away while on a trip to Ireland. The industry will miss him.)

by Steve Volk